“It depends on the social environment whether punishment has a utility and vendettas can develop", says Katrin Fehl of the University of Göttingen. Both benefit from this pool as a result, but not as much when they do not pay in and only profit from the share of the other player. In this classic game used in behavioural biology, two players can decide whether to pay part of their playing capital into the common pool. Several of the participants appeared to anticipate the risk of potential vendettas and delayed their punishments as long as possible," explained Manfred Milinski from the Max Planck Institute in Plön.īy contrast, the researchers observed almost no punishment and even fewer vendettas in what is known as the "Prisoner's Dilemma". Despite this, the players succeeded in enhancing the level of cooperation through the mechanism of punishment. "As a result of punishment for misconduct, vendettas regularly arose, especially when the original punishment was unjust or excessive. Under these conditions, players punish one another if they pay too little money or none at all into the common pool. During successive rounds, they were able to punish their fellow players who refused to cooperate and be punished themselves.
During the experiment, each of four players had to decide what share of their initial playing capital they wanted to pay into a common pool for the benefit of all. Manfred Milinski and his colleagues therefore tested the behaviour of subject groups in public good games. According to theory, the best reaction to punishment is to behave in the same uncooperative manner.Ĭonsequently, vendettas should arise – if at all – only in conflicts within a group of three or more individuals. They do not occur in the case of conflicts between two persons, because the most reasonable response to uncooperative behaviour is for people themselves to behave uncooperatively, rather than punishing the other person. Theoretical studies have concluded that dyadic vendettas do not endure. As a result, conflict resolution and cooperative behaviour become impossible.
EYE FOR AN EYE TOOTH FOR A TOOTH SERIES
In this manner, a series of vengeful acts can arise from a single act of revenge, which damages stakeholders and, ultimately, society on the whole. But forcing cooperation in this way carries a danger – the punished individual may strike back if he or she does not accept the punishment. Nevertheless, punishment is widespread in the animal kingdom and among humans, for it encourages cooperative behaviour among members of a society. Their findings suggest that vendettas among members of one group can remain viable over the long term.įrom the evolutionary perspective, punishment for misconduct is costly: not only for the person punished, but also for those carrying out the punishment, as they must utilise resources for this purpose. Manfred Milinski and his colleagues from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology in Plön and the University of Göttingen have now, for the first time, investigated the genesis of vendettas.
Theoretical calculations also demonstrate that vendettas are costly for the participants from an evolutionary point of view and should therefore not develop. The harm for the participants is enormous and lacks apparent benefit, as the participants often no longer remember what actually triggered the quarrel. Such vendettas and blood feuds occur in many societies, sometimes lasting for decades. Now the male members of the families involved in the blood feud do not dare leave their homes. After one of the players had been injured in a subsequent dispute, his team members shot a relative of the suspected attacker. It all began with a harmless game of soccer among young men in northwestern Albania.